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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of limited enforceable international loans
on international risk sharing and trade fluctuations in a two-country two-
good endowment economy. Our specification of the punishment threat allows
the exclusion from trade to last only finitely many periods and distinguishes
between financial autarky and full autarky. Quantitative results show that
limited enforceability substantially alters cross-country consumption corre-
lations and the dynamics of net exports. In contrast to existing studies, risk
sharing is low for large elasticities of substitution between the domestic and
foreign goods. However, it remains challenging to explain the high volatility
of the terms of trade empirically observed.
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1 Introduction
There are two well-known puzzles in international business cycle theory with
complete markets: first, standard models generate cross-country correlations
of consumption that are much higher than we find in the data and second,
the terms of trade are less volatile than it is empirically observed. Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1992, 1994) call the first puzzle the ‘quantity anomaly’
and the second the ‘price anomaly’.
In a recent study Kehoe and Perri (2002) show that financial frictions
due to dynamic incentive constraints help to resolve the quantity anomaly.
They argue that international loans are imperfectly enforceable in the sense
that countries may not be willing to keep their promises to repay their debt.
In a standard model with two countries producing perfect substitutes, in-
ternational loans are restricted to be feasible only if, at any point in time,
they are enforceable by the threat of an exclusion from future international
borrowing and lending forever.
This paper analyzes the impact of limited enforceable international loans
on international risk sharing and trade fluctuations. In a pure endowment
economy the traded goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes which
yields endogenous and varying terms of trade. We focus on the specifica-
tion of limited enforceability and make two substantive changes compared
to Kehoe and Perri (2002) that have a considerable effect on consumption
correlations and trade. First, since an infinite punishment would be hard to
enforce, the exclusion from future trade is allowed to last only finitely many
periods. Second, we analyze the impact of different punishment threats and
distinguish between the exclusion from international borrowing and lending
and the exclusion from all intertemporal and interstate trade.
A key issue to resolve is how to start a new and imperfectly enforceable
contract after an exclusion period. Formally, all contracts solve social plan-
ning problems subject to enforcement constraints. We assume that the new
contract is characterized by potential new initial welfare weights assigned to
each country. The associated allocation can be understood as the outcome
of renegotiations that countries conduct in order to arrive at a new agree-
ment. We perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the assignment of
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the new weights and to the periods of exclusion and analyze in detail the
impact of these new enforcement constraints on cross-country consumption
correlations, trade fluctuations and welfare.
To solve the model we extend the approach by Marcet and Marimon
(1998) who propose to introduce additional co-state variables that measure
the binding pattern of the enforcement constraints. Our framework requires
taking into account that after a finite period of exclusion a new and imper-
fectly enforceable contract is started.
Intuitively our model works as follows. First, suppose markets are com-
plete and a shock occurs that increases domestic endowment. The price of the
domestic good decreases and the terms of trade increase. Since the foreign
good is relatively more expensive, imports decrease and exports increase,
such that net exports are pro-cyclical. Complete markets perfectly insure
country-specific risks and consumption is strongly smoothed across countries.
However, international loans are imperfectly enforceable and countries might
have incentives to default in order to fully exploit the gains of positive en-
dowment shocks. To prevent the country from choosing this option, domestic
consumption has to increase more and foreign consumption less compared to
the complete markets allocation. This implies that international risk sharing
is reduced. The increase in domestic consumption is realized by adjustments
of imports. In the simple endowment setup it depends crucially on the severe-
ness of the punishment threat whether net exports behave pro-cyclically or
counter-cyclically.
Quantitative results show that limited enforceable international loans
substantially reduce international risk sharing. The specification of the value
of default turns out to be critical for cross-country consumption correlations,
trade fluctuations and welfare. Particularly, when considering full autarky
as a punishment threat, the finite exclusion length is essential as the traded
goods are imperfect substitutes and countries are dependent on trade. In this
case a very long exclusion period poses a severe threat, such that the incen-
tives to repudiate are low. The associated consumption co-movements and
trade fluctuations are similar compared to the complete markets scenario.
It turns out that the exclusion from international borrowing and lending
is a weak punishment threat, such that the incentives to default are very
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high independent of the exclusion length. In order to fulfill the enforcement
constraint, consumption and imports are adjusted in such a way that vir-
tually no risk sharing occurs. Moreover, in this case net exports appear to
be counter-cyclical but with very low volatility. The severeness of the pun-
ishment threat is highlighted by the associated welfare loss. The stronger
the incentives to default the larger is the welfare loss generated by limited
contract enforceability.
As also noted by e.g. Backus et al. (1994) and Heathcote and Perri (2002),
the implications of this class of models are sensitive with respect to the elas-
ticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. However, we find
that limited enforceability of international loans generate lower cross-country
consumption correlations for higher elasticities in contrast to complete mar-
kets that act reversely. With respect to the price anomaly we find that
the volatility of the terms of trade is even lower compared to the complete
markets outcome. This is due to the fact that import and export flows are
adjusted in order to decrease the incentives to default.
This paper is related to the literature on sovereign debt, like e.g. Bulow
and Rogoff (1989) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Eaton and Fernandez
(1995) provide a survey on the international debt literature. Furthermore,
the approach of limited contract enforceability is connected to the litera-
ture on debt-constrained asset markets like e.g. Kehoe and Levine (1993,
2001), Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (1999, 2000). Marcet
and Marimon (1992) have shown that enforcement constraints reduce invest-
ment patterns and economic growth. Other papers in different areas of eco-
nomic research that consider limited contract enforceability are e.g. Aiyagari,
Marcet, Sargent and Seppa¨la¨ (2002), Kru¨ger and Perri (2005), Cooley, Mari-
mon and Quadrini (2003), Jeske (2001), Kru¨ger and Uhlig (2005) and Kehoe
and Perri (2004). In the international business cycle literature some papers
introduce exogenous incomplete markets to solve the quantity anomaly. For
example Kollmann (1996) and Baxter and Crucini (1995) exogenously re-
strict the number of traded assets. Among others, Kim, Kim and Levin
(2003) investigate in detail the welfare implications of exogenous incomplete
markets in a two-country endowment economy. Heathcote and Perri (2002)
extend an approach by Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and compare complete mar-
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kets, exogenous incomplete markets and financial autarky. They show that
the extent of international borrowing and lending opportunities is important
for the international business cycle. Other papers that maintain the assump-
tion of complete markets are e.g. Stockman and Tesar (1995) and Betts and
Kehoe (2001) who incorporate non-traded goods and taste shocks to explain
international co-movements. Mazzenga and Ravn (1998) analyze the effects
of including transportation costs whereas Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003)
introduce distribution costs in international business cycle models. To ex-
plain the dynamics of the terms of trade Backus and Crucini (2000) study the
impact of oil prices while Cun˜at and Maffezzoli (2004) introduce Heckscher-
Ohlin trade features in a dynamic general equilibrium model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses some
stylized facts concerning international risk sharing and trade fluctuations.
In Section 3 a two-country two-good pure endowment economy with limited
enforceable international loans is developed and analyzed. Section 4 handles
the computational method and parameterizations. Quantitative results are
discussed in Section 5 and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Properties of International Business Cycles
To set the stage, we briefly summarize some stylized facts of international
business cycles. For more detailed studies of international data the reader is
referred to e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) and Zimmermann (1997).
Table 1 and 2 list moments of international co-movements, the terms
of trade and net exports considering the economies of Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United
States. The quarterly data are taken from the International Monetary Fund,
Financial Statistics. The sample period starts in the first quarter of 1970
and ends in the fourth quarter of 1998. After taking the natural logarithm
(except for net exports) the time series are Hodrick-Prescott filtered. Ta-
ble 1 reports correlations of consumption and, for comparability, of output
across countries. First of all, it is evident that cross-country correlations
of output are higher than cross-country correlations of consumption. The
fairly low consumption correlations clearly indicate that international risk
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sharing is greatly inhibited. Across most countries consumption correlations
are positive but for some country pairs - e.g. Germany and Canada, US and
Australia, or Japan and Australia - they are negative. Table 2 reports busi-
ness cycle statistics with respect to the terms of trade and net exports. We
follow Backus et al. (1994) and define the terms of trade as the relative price
of imports to exports. This corresponds to the convention concerning the
real exchange rates in international macroeconomics. The high volatility of
the terms of trade is evident for all countries. Moreover, it is striking that
the correlations between the terms of trade and domestic output are negative
for all countries except for Italy. This is also noted by Cuna˜t and Maffez-
zoli (2003): in standard international business cycle models the correlations
between output and the terms of trade are positive and high whereas in the
data the correlations are low or negative. With respect to net exports Table
2 shows that they behave counter-cyclically.
3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
The environment of our model is similar to the one in Backus et al. (1994).
There are two countries, i = 1, 2, each inhabited by a large number of
infinitely-lived identical agents who maximize utility. The two countries trade
two different, imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods which are trans-
formed into country-specific final goods. Country 1 and 2 are assumed to be
the domestic and foreign country, respectively. Fluctuations are driven by
country-specific stochastic shocks to endowment.
In each country preferences of the representative agent are given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ci,t), i = 1, 2,
with 0 < β < 1. ci,t denotes period t consumption in country i. The utility
function is assumed to be u(ci,t) = c
1−σ
i,t /(1 − σ) where σ is the parameter
of relative risk aversion. Country 1 and country 2 are endowed with in-
termediate goods at and bt, respectively. ai,t and bi,t denote the use of the
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two intermediate goods in country i. Country 1 consumes a1,t and b1,t and
exports a2,t while country 2 consumes b2,t and a2,t and exports b1,t.
Consumption ci,t is a composite of foreign and domestic goods:
ci,t = G
i(ai,t, bi,t), i = 1, 2, (1)
where Gi(ai,t, bi,t) is an aggregator proposed by Armington (1969):
G1(a1,t, b1,t) = (ω1a
−ρ
1,t + ω2b
−ρ
1,t )
−1/ρ
G2(a2,t, b2,t) = (ω2a
−ρ
2,t + ω1b
−ρ
2,t )
−1/ρ. (2)
ω1 and ω2 denote the weights specifying the domestic and foreign content
of domestic consumption. The elasticity of substitution between foreign and
domestic goods is given by η = 1/(1 + ρ). The Armington aggregator trans-
forms the intermediate goods a and b into a country-specific final good. Note
that G1 and G2 are defined symmetrically for the two countries.
The resource constraints are given by
z1,ty1 = a1,t + a2,t
z2,ty2 = b1,t + b2,t, (3)
where zi,t are exogenous stochastic shocks to endowment yi, i = 1, 2.
3.2 Limited Enforceable International Loans
Standard international business cycle models as e.g. Backus et al. (1994)
proceed under the assumption of perfect markets. In particular, countries
can go into debt repaying it at a future point. In an international context,
though, a large literature has argued that international loans are imper-
fectly enforceable: countries only repay their debt if they have an incentive
to do so (see e.g. Bulow and Rogoff (1989)). In a recent study Kehoe and
Perri (2002) assume that international loans are feasible only if, at any point
in time, they are enforceable by the threat of an exclusion from future in-
tertemporal and interstate trade forever. However, such an infinite exclusion
would probably be hard to enforce, particularly in a framework with imper-
fectly substitutable traded goods. Therefore, we allow for the possibility that
countries renegotiate and conclude a new trade agreement even though one
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country has chosen to default. We assume that repudiation is followed by a
stay in autarky that lasts only finitely many periods. After such an exclusion
period a new and imperfectly enforceable contract is started. Moreover, we
distinguish between the exclusion from international borrowing and lending
and the exclusion from all intertemporal and interstate trade.
We introduce enforcement constraints that restrict international loans to
be feasible only if, at any point in time, they are enforceable by the threat
of staying in autarky until a new trade contract is concluded. The exclusion
from trade lasts K periods. Formally, we assume that the following social
planning problem is solved at date s:
{ct(α, zs), at(α, zs), bt(α, zs)}∞t=s = argmax{ct, at, bt}∞t=s
Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
∑
i=1,2
αiu(ci,t) (4)
s.t.
Et
∞∑
`=0
β`u(ci,t+`) ≥ Et
(
K−1∑
m=0
βmu(c˜i,t+m) +
∞∑
n=K
βnu(ci,t+n(α̂i, zi,t+K))
)
(5)
(1), (2) and (3).
α = (α1, α2) are the weights that the social planner puts on the welfare of the
countries. Throughout the paper we assume α1 = α2. zs = (z1,s, z2,s) are the
realizations of the endowment shocks known at date s. {c˜t+m}K−1m=0 denotes
consumption during autarky. {ct+n(α̂, zt+K), at+n(α̂, zt+K), bt+n(α̂, zt+K)}∞n=0
is the allocation associated with the new and imperfectly enforceable contract
that is concluded after the K-period stay in autarky. It depends on the
realizations of the endowment shocks known at date t+K and on new welfare
weights α̂ = (α̂1, α̂2). α̂i is the weight put on the welfare of the repudiating
country i and α̂j = 1− α̂i, j 6= i, is the weight assigned to the other country
j. In the following we discuss how to specify the autarky allocation, the
length of time of exclusion from trade K and the new welfare weights α̂.
To specify the autarky allocation we consider two punishment scenar-
ios. In the first scenario the defaulting country is punished by a K-period
exclusion from all intertemporal and interstate trade, i.e. {c˜1,t+m}K−1m=0 =
G1(a˜1,t+m, 0) and {c˜2,t+m}K−1m=0 = G2(0, b˜2,t+m). We label this scenario as
‘full autarky’. In the second scenario the defaulting country is punished by a
K-period exclusion from intertemporal trade. In this scenario countries keep
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trading but they do not have international borrowing and lending opportuni-
ties, i.e. trade has to be balanced every period. Following Cole and Obstfeld
(1991) we call this scenario ‘financial autarky’. In financial autarky country
1 and country 2 solve the following maximization problems at time t given
the terms of trade p˜t+m:
max Et
∑K−1
m=0 β
mu(c˜1,t+m) max Et
∑K−1
m=0 β
mu(c˜2,t+m)
s.t. s.t.
a˜1,t+m + p˜t+mb˜1,t+m = z1,t+m y1 a˜2,t+m/p˜t+m + b˜2,t+m = z2,t+m y2
c˜1,t+m = G
1(a˜1,t+m, b˜1,t+m) c˜2,t+m = G
2(a˜2,t+m, b˜2,t+m)
Market clearing determines p˜t+m, such that the resource constraints (3) of
both countries are fulfilled. Note that if the traded goods are perfect substi-
tutes, financial autarky is equivalent to full autarky. Assuming full autarky
as a punishment can be motivated by trade sanctions that are imposed on
repudiating countries. One might argue that full autarky seems to be an unre-
alistically strong punishment, especially in a world economy with imperfectly
substitutable goods. Note, however, that assuming financial autarky instead
is a less severe threat that creates higher incentives to default in this model.
We treat the length of time in autarky K and the welfare weights of
the new contract α̂i as exogenously given. The allocation associated with
α̂i can be interpreted as the outcome of renegotiations that the two coun-
tries conduct after a K-period stay in autarky. We assume that the contract
that was in place before repudiation does not influence the bargaining pro-
cess after repudiation. This is a reasonable assumption if one supposes that
both countries are interested in a recommencement and want to revive trade
connections. The implication is that, at any point in time, renegotiations
result in the same outcome. Therefore, the new weight on the welfare of
the repudiating country α̂i is taken to be independent of the initial welfare
weights α and constant over time. As a benchmark we consider new welfare
weights that are equal for both countries, α̂i = α̂j, since symmetric coun-
tries are likely to have equal bargaining power independent of repudiation.
However, it also seems reasonable to assign a lower weight to the country
that has chosen to default, α̂i < α̂j, which can be interpreted as a general
punishment for repudiation. Alternatively, this can be viewed as the amount
of debt that the defaulting country has to pay back. On the other hand one
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might argue that renegotiations result in a larger weight on the welfare of
the repudiating country, α̂i > α̂j, since imperfect substitutability of traded
goods implies that the other country is also hurt by the collapse of trade and
is likely to be interested in a fast agreement. Even though it is costly, the
other country might want to induce the repudiating country to enter a new
trade agreement by accepting a contract with a lower weight. Later on we
perform a detailed sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of α̂ and K.
3.3 Analysis
A key condition in standard dynamic programming techniques is that only
past realizations of the variables can influence the set of feasible current
actions. Here the enforcement constraints (5) include future actions. To solve
the social planning problem we follow the approach developed by Marcet and
Marimon (1998) and introduce additional co-state variables:
wi,t = wi,t−1 + γi,t, wi,s−1 = αi, i = 1, 2. (6)
γi,t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, denote the Lagrange multipliers on the enforcement con-
straints. The co-state variables wi,t, i = 1, 2, measure the potentially com-
plicated binding patterns of the enforcement constraints of the domestic and
foreign country. If country i’s enforcement constraint is not binding at time
t, γi,t is equal to zero and wi,t is determined by past binding patterns. If
country i’s enforcement constraint is binding at time t, γi,t is strictly greater
than zero and wi,t increases. The planner’s problem can be transformed into
the following saddle-point formulation by using the co-state variables (6), the
law of iterated expectations and simple algebra:
min
{γt ≥ 0}∞t=s
max
{ct, at, bt}∞t=s
Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
(∑
i=1,2
wi,t u(ci,t)− γi,tDi,t
)
(7)
s.t.
Di,t =
[
K−1∑
m=0
βm u(c˜i,t+m) +
∞∑
n=K
βn u(ci,t+n(α̂i, zt+K))
]
(1), (2), (3) and (6).
This formulation clearly shows that the co-state variables wi,t work as welfare
weights. If country i has an incentive to repudiate, the social planner has
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to increase the welfare weight wi,t, such that the enforcement constraint of
country i is fulfilled.
{ct(α, zs), at(α, zs), bt(α, zs), γt(α, zs)}∞t=s is given by the first order condi-
tions
uc1,t
uc2,t
(
−G
1
a1,t
G2,1a1,t
)
=
w2,t
w1,t
(8)
G1a1,t
G1b1,t
=
G2,1a1,t
G2,1b1,t
(9)
together with the the constraints (1) to (3), the law of motion for the co-state
variable (6), the complementary slackness conditions and G2,1(a1,t, b1,t) =
G2((z1,ty1 − a1,t), (z2,ty2 − b1,t)). uci,t is the abbreviation for ∂u(ci,t)/∂ci,t
(similarly for other terms). The outside option Di,t depends on the allocation
associated with the new, imperfectly enforceable contract {ct+n(α̂, zt+K),
at+n(α̂, zt+K), bt+n(α̂, zt+K), γt+n(α̂, zt+K)}∞n=0 which is given by the optimal-
ity conditions (8), (9), the constraints (1) to (3), the complementary slackness
conditions at date t + n and wi,t+n = wi,t+n−1 + γi,t+n with wi,t+K−1 = α̂i,
i = 1, 2.
The terms of trade pt are given by the relative price of imports to exports
and are equal to the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods
in country 1 evaluated at equilibrium quantities :
pt =
pb,t
pa,t
=
G1b1,t
G1a1,t
=
ω2
ω1
(
a1,t
b1,t
)ρ+1
. (10)
The optimal allocation requires the efficient choice of the time-dependent
welfare weights wi,t such that the enforcement constraints are fulfilled. Sup-
pose both enforcement constraints are never binding: γ1,t = γ2,t = 0 ∀ t.
Then the left-hand side of (8) is equal to α2/α1 which implies perfect insur-
ance of country-specific risks. Now suppose a shock occurs that increases
domestic endowment such that country 1 has an incentive to repudiate. To
prevent the country from taking this option, the social planer has to rise do-
mestic consumption by increasing the weight w1,t. Formally, the enforcement
constraint of country 1 is binding, γ1,t > 0, and w1,t increases, such that the
ratio of marginal utilities decreases (see equation (8)). Hence, consumption
sharing is reduced.
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The impact of limited enforceable international loans on risk sharing and
trade depends on the value of default Di,t. Clearly, the higher the value
of the outside option the larger the incentive to repudiate. Since the opti-
mality conditions and complementary slackness conditions form a dynamic
nonlinear system with occasionally binding constraints, and the value of de-
fault depends on the periods of trade exclusion and on new and imperfectly
enforceable contracts, we solve the model numerically.
4 Numerical Solution
4.1 Parameterizing the Outside Option
Key parameters of the model are those that specify the value of the outside
option. In the following we discuss the parameterizations of K and α̂.
K is the parameter that denotes the number of periods countries have to
stay in autarky after default. Suppose a shock occurs that increases domestic
endowment. Then for low values of K one expects the domestic country to
have high incentives to repudiate since it will not take long until a new trade
contract is concluded. The consequences of default are mild. Hence, the
domestic country is likely to be better off by abandoning trade connections
and reducing risk sharing in order to fully exploit the gains of positive shocks.
On the other hand, because countries trade imperfectly substitutable goods,
long periods of exclusion from trade are likely to hurt the domestic country,
such that the incentive to repudiate is low. As a strategy for parameterizing
K we start with a one-period exclusion from trade and increase K as long
as there is still an incentive to default.
α̂i is the new weight that is initially put on the welfare of the repudiating
country after an exclusion period. As argued before, the new welfare weight
is assumed to be independent of the contract that was in place before repudi-
ation and constant over time. We simply define α̂i = 0.5+ ζ, α̂j = 1− α̂i. As
a benchmark we take ζ = 0 which implies equal new weights on the welfare
of both countries, α̂i = α̂j. This corresponds to the assumption that both
countries have equal bargaining power independent of repudiation. Assum-
ing ζ < 0, i.e. α̂i < α̂j, implies a punishment since renegotiations result in a
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new contract that is less favorable for the repudiating country. The value of
the outside option and, hence, the incentive to default is lower compared to
ζ = 0. On the other hand, ζ > 0, i.e. α̂i > α̂j, implies that even though it is
costly, the other country wants to induce the repudiating country to enter a
new trade agreement by accepting a contract with a lower weight. The value
of the outside option is larger compared to ζ = 0, and countries experiencing
positive shocks are more likely to default. Already small values of ζ influence
the results strongly. We vary ζ between −0.01 and +0.01 and analyze the
associated properties of the theoretical economy.
Alternatively one could assume that the new initial weight on the welfare
of the repudiating country α̂i depends on the level of the co-state variable
before repudiation, wi,t−1, that measures the past binding patterns of the
enforcement constraints. This corresponds to the assumption that countries
do not forget and do not forgive past defaults. Quantitative results look
similar for both parameterizations. However, we find it more appropriate to
rule out dependencies on former contracts and continue with welfare weights
that are constant over time as argued before.
4.2 Calibration
In addition to the parameters of the outside option, the elasticity of substi-
tution between domestic and foreign goods η is a crucial parameter in this
model. Since η measures the importance of trade, it influences the incentives
to repudiate. In the empirical literature we find a wide range of estimates
for η. While Whalley (1985) and Shiells and Reinhart (1993) find values be-
tween 0.8 and 1.9 and 0.1 and 1.1, respectively, Hummels (1999a, 1999b) and
Trefler and Lai (1999) propose elasticities between 5 and 6. Harrigan (1993)
reports estimates between 5 and 12 (see also the discussion by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000)). While Backus et al. (1994) choose values around 1.5, we try
different values between 1 and 7.
In a symmetric steady state y1 = y2 and b1 = a2, such that the ratio
a1/b1 is determined by (1 − b1/y1)/(b1/y1) where b1/y1 is the import share
of GDP. Using the steady state version of the optimality condition (10) that
determines the terms of trade, the value of the Armington weights ωi can
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be found. Import shares of 0.09, 0.12 and 0.15 are used where the latter is
employed as a benchmark. The parameter of relative risk aversion equals 2
and the time preference β is set to 0.99.
The endowment shocks of the two countries (z1,t, z2,t) are assumed to
follow a first order vector autoregressive process(
z1,t
z2,t
)
=
(
φ11 φ12
φ21 φ22
)(
z1,t−1
z2,t−1
)
+
(
²1,t
²2,t
)
,
where the error terms ²i,t are Gaussian white noise. As a benchmark calibra-
tion we use φ11 = φ22 = 0.97, φ12 = φ21 = 0, var(²1) = var(²2) = (0.007)
2
and corr(²1, ²2) = 0.25 which is in line with studies by Baxter and Crucini
(1995), Kollmann (1996) and Cun˜at and Maffezzoli (2003) who find little
evidence for spill-over effects across countries. In the sensitivity analysis,
we consider φ11 = φ22 = 0.99 as well as φ11 = φ22 = 0.95 to analyze the
impact of higher and lower persistence on the economy. Moreover, we allow
for spill-over effects, φ12 = φ21 = 0.025.
4.3 Computational Method
For convenience we reduce the number of state variables by considering the
relative weight of the two countries qt =
w2,t
w1,t
and defining the normalized
multiplier di,t =
γi,t
wi,t
for i = 1, 2. The optimality conditions can be rewritten
as:
uc1,t
uc2,t
(
−G
1
a1,t
G2,1a1,t
)
= qt (11)
G1a1,t
G1b1,t
=
G2,1a1,t
G2,1b1,t
(12)
qt =
1− d1,t
1− d2,t qt−1 (13)
qs−1 =
α2
α1
together with the constraints (1) to (3) and the complementary slackness
conditions.
Let efficient allocations at time t be described by time invariant policy
functions dependent on the state variable qt−1 and the shock zt. To solve
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for the policy functions we apply a numerical algorithm that is similar to
the one used by Kehoe and Perri (2002). We discretize the state space
and approximate the continuous-valued shock process by a two-state Markov
chain using the method suggested by Tauchen (1986). Let s = (q, z) be the
state. We define the value function
Vi(α, s) = u(ci(α, s)) + βE[Vi(α, s
′)], i = 1, 2,
where the prime denotes the next period. Let ŝ denote the state after K
periods in autarky. The value function of the new, imperfectly enforceable
contract is given by
Vi(α̂, ŝ) = u(ci(α̂, ŝ)) + βE[Vi(α̂, sˆ
′)], i = 1, 2.
We start with an initial guess V
(0)
i , i = 1, 2. The new value functions V
(1)
i ,
i = 1, 2, are found as follows. First, we assume that neither enforcement
constraint binds and compute the corresponding allocations using the nor-
malized first order conditions (11) and (12) and the resource constraints (1)
to (3) under the assumption that both multipliers are equal to zero. We use
Vi(α̂, ŝ), i = 1, 2, to check whether the constructed allocations satisfy the
enforcement constraints (5). If e.g. the enforcement constraint of the foreign
country is satisfied but not the one for the domestic country, the multiplier
of the foreign country is set to zero. The domestic multiplier and the allo-
cation are recalculated using the normalized first order conditions and the
enforcement constraint of the domestic country fulfilled with equality. If the
enforcement constraint of the domestic country is satisfied but not the one
for the foreign country, the multiplier of the domestic country is set to zero,
and the foreign multiplier as well as the allocation are recalculated analo-
gously. The algorithm is iterated until the value functions converge on every
grid point.
5 Quantitative Properties of the Model
5.1 When Do the Enforcement Constraints Bind?
To study the quantitative properties of the theoretical economy, we start by
analyzing the question under what conditions countries do have incentives
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to default on their debt. Whether the enforcement constraints bind depends
crucially on the specification of the outside option. We start by considering
the case of full autarky, i.e. repudiating countries are punished by a K-period
exclusion from all intertemporal and interstate trade. We focus our attention
on the number of exclusion periods K and the initial welfare weights of the
new trade agreement α̂i = 0.5 + ζ. Suppose asymmetric shocks occur that
increase endowment in the domestic country. Considering 0 < K < 25 and
−0.01 ≤ ζ ≤ 0.01, Figure 1 plots the multiplier on the domestic enforcement
constraint at time t, d1,t, under the assumption that in t−1 the welfare of both
countries are weighted equally, qt−1 = 1. The figure shows that for values of
ζ implying α̂1 < α̂2 the normalized domestic multiplier is decreasing in K.
The interpretation is straightforward: new small initial welfare weights can be
understood as a punishment, since the renegotiated contracts are of low value
to the domestic country. Therefore, the incentives to default are low. The
smaller ζ, i.e. the lower the welfare weight α̂1, the more severe is the penalty
and the lower is the multiplier. Since high values of K represent protracted
renegotiations, i.e. a long stay in full autarky, the domestic country has low
incentives to default. Interestingly, for large positive values of ζ, i.e. α̂1 > α̂2,
the multiplier shows a hump shape in K. To understand this, note that first,
the shock process is very persistent and, second, positive values of ζ imply
that renegotiations result in a more favorable new contract for the repudiating
country. Because the shock persistence is high, the domestic country expects
to experience another positive shock in the following period and at the same
time anticipates the advantageous new agreement. Therefore, the multiplier
is increasing in K. On the other hand, for values of K large enough, the
multiplier is falling in K. The higher K the more the country expects to
be hit by a bad shock that decreases the value of staying in autarky and
compensates the effect of a large new welfare weight. The two opposing
effects imply that the incentive to default is hump shaped in K. Note that for
K large enough the enforcement constraint is not binding anymore, d1,t = 0,
and the model collapses to the complete markets scenario. If repudiating
countries are punished by a long period of exclusion from all trade, there are
no incentives to default and the international loans arising under complete
markets are self-enforcing.
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In addition to the parameters of the outside optionK and α̂, the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods η determines crucially
the incentive to default since it indicates the importance of trade connec-
tions. In the following we focus on the impact of η and compare full autarky
and financial autarky as punishment threats. Figure 2 assumes asymmetric
shocks that increase domestic endowment and holds the new initial welfare
weights α̂1 = α̂2 and the punishment length K = 4 fixed. The value of the
normalized domestic multiplier at time t, d1,t, is plotted for different elas-
ticities of substitution η. The figure shows that the domestic enforcement
constraint does not bind for low elasticities of substitution if the repudiating
country is punished by a stay in full autarky. The intuition behind this result
is that the domestic country is very dependent on imports of the foreign good
in order to produce the country-specific final consumption good. There is no
incentive to default since any (short) exclusion from future trade is miserable.
For η ≥ 4.5 the multiplier d1 is strictly greater than zero and is increasing in
η. The higher the substitutability of domestic and foreign goods the higher
is the country’s incentive to default on its debt because autarky is becom-
ing a less harmful threat. If the defaulting country is punished by financial
autarky, the multiplier is much larger. The incentives to default are higher
because the exclusion from international lending and borrowing is a less se-
vere punishment than full exclusion from trade. In contrast to full autarky,
the enforcement constraint is binding for low elasticities of substitution since
countries are still allowed to trade the commodities.
5.2 Limited Enforceable Loans and Risk Sharing
The question of interest is how limited enforceable international loans in-
fluence the degree of risk sharing across countries. Qualitatively, the model
works as follows. Suppose a shock occurs that increases domestic endowment
and default is an attractive choice. To prevent the domestic country from
choosing this option, compared to the complete markets outcome, the social
planner has to increase domestic consumption more and foreign consumption
less by increasing the welfare weight of the domestic country (see equation
(8)). This implies that risk sharing is reduced.
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To study the quantitative impact of enforcement constraints, we con-
sider different parameterizations of the outside option, simulate the model
and calculate the theoretical moments. We compare the results relative to
the complete markets outcome, i.e. we determine by how many percent en-
forcement constraints reduce the correlations if the correlations generated by
complete markets serve as a benchmark.
First, we focus on full autarky as a punishment for default. Table 3
reports the relative percentage reductions in cross-country consumption cor-
relations considering various values of the exclusion period K, of the new
initial welfare weights α̂i = 0.5 + ζ, and of the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods η. Clearly, limited enforceable loans
reduce the amount of international risk sharing considerably. Assume ζ = 0,
i.e. α̂i = α̂j, and K = 4: consumption correlations are reduced by about 8,
21 and 33 percent for η = 5, 6, 7, respectively. It is evident that the shape
of the multiplier directly transmits into the correlation patterns. The larger
the multiplier, i.e. the larger the incentive to default, the greater is the per-
centage decrease in correlations relative to the complete markets outcome.
For ζ ≤ 0 the reductions decrease in K since a long stay in autarky that
ends in a disadvantageous new contract decreases the value of repudiating
the contract. For large positive values of ζ the correlations show a hump
shape in K as the multiplier does. The reductions of correlations first in-
crease in K and then approach zero again. E.g. for ζ = 0.01, η = 5 and
K = 4 the enforcement constraints reduce consumption correlations by 17
percent while for K = 8 the reduction amounts to 23 percent. Increasing K
beyond 16 yields the complete markets outcome.
Table 4 focuses on financial autarky as a punishment threat and reports
the relative percentage change in cross-country consumption correlations for
various values of K and η. Even for low elasticities of substitution interna-
tional risk sharing is greatly inhibited in correspondence to the very large
values of the multiplier on the enforcement constraint as seen in Figure 2.
E.g. assuming η = 1.5 results in a relative reduction of consumption cor-
relations of 77 percent. The larger η the larger the impact of enforcement
constraints on consumption sharing since countries are less dependent on
trade. In this scenario increasing the length of punishment K has minimal
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effects. This corresponds to the finding that financial autarky does not pose a
severe punishment and is in line with the results in Cole and Obstfeld (1991)
who find that the loss generated by an exclusion from international portfolio
diversification is marginal.
The first columns of Table 5 shed light on the impact of limited en-
forceability on international risk sharing from another point of view. With
particular regard to the importance of import shares and elasticities of sub-
stitution, cross-country consumption correlations are reported considering
the two punishment scenarios and the complete markets case. Like noted
by e.g. Backus et al. (1994) complete markets generate rising cross-country
correlations of consumption as the elasticity of substitution increases. Ta-
ble 5 shows that the introduction of enforcement constraints has the reverse
effect: limited contract enforceability reduces cross-country correlations to
fairly low levels, the higher the elasticity of substitution is. As an exam-
ple consider b1/y1 = 0.09 and full autarky as punishment scenario. For
η = 5 and η = 7 cross-country consumption correlations are about 0.56 and
0.38 whereas complete markets generate correlations around 0.92 and 0.95,
respectively. Assuming financial autarky as a punishment scenario yields
qualitatively the same effect, however, consumption correlations are close to
zero, i.e. virtually no risk sharing can be observed.
Reducing the import share results in stronger impacts of enforcement
constraints on international risk sharing. Intuitively, lower import shares
indicate that economies are less open to trade. The lower the import share
the less serious are the consequences of an exclusion from trade and the
incentives to repudiate are high. Consider η = 6 and full exclusion from
trade. Import shares of 0.15, 0.12 and 0.09 imply consumption correlations
of 0.77, 0.62 and 0.24, respectively.
5.3 Limited Enforceable Loans and Trade Fluctuations
This section focuses on the impact of enforcement constraints on trade fluc-
tuations and international prices. Table 6 contrasts the world economy with
complete markets with the world economy where loans are imperfectly en-
forceable. The correlations of imports, exports and net exports with domestic
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output are reported assuming K = 4, α̂i = α̂j and η = 5. First consider the
world economy with complete markets and suppose a shock occurs that in-
creases domestic endowment. Since the price of the domestic good decreases,
the foreign good is relatively more expensive. Imports fall and exports rise,
such that net exports are pro-cyclical. Because markets are complete, con-
sumption in both countries increases. Now consider imperfectly enforceable
loans and assume that the defaulting country is punished by a stay in full
autarky. Again suppose a positive domestic endowment shock occurs making
default an attractive option. To prevent the domestic country from taking
this option, the social planner has to raise domestic consumption more and
foreign consumption less. Imports decrease less and net exports are less pro-
cyclical than in the world economy with complete markets. Next assume that
the defaulting country is punished by an exclusion from international borrow-
ing and lending. Since financial autarky does not pose a severe punishment,
the incentive to repudiate is very high and we barely observe consumption
sharing. To realize the high value of domestic consumption, imports have to
increase, such that net exports behave counter-cyclically. However, in this
case the volatility of net exports is very small.
The reactions of imports and exports in response to endowment shocks are
reflected in the dynamics of the terms of trade. Considering the world econ-
omy with complete markets and the world economy with limited enforceable
loans, Table 5 reports the correlations with output and standard deviations
for different elasticities of substitution η and different import shares b1/y1.
Since a positive domestic endowment shock decreases the price of imports,
the terms of trade defined as the relative price of imports to exports increase.
This occurs independently of parameter values and punishment scenarios and
is in contrast to the observed negative correlations of the terms of trade and
output in the data. However, the reactions of the terms of trade are less
strong, the more the enforcement constraints bind which is in line with the
pattern of net exports. Consider e.g. the case η = 5 and b1/y1 = 0.15. The
standard deviation of the terms of trade is around 1.2 percent in the com-
plete markets scenario. Assuming limited enforceable international loans, the
volatility decreases to 1.1 and 0.4 percent depending on the punishment sce-
nario. Inspecting the volatility of the terms of trade found in the data reveals
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the price anomaly: the standard deviations of the terms of trade generated
by the model economies is far too low (compared with Table 2). Assuming
limited enforceability of international loans leads to a more pronounced price
anomaly.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
This section conducts some sensitivity experiments especially with respect
to the specification of the shock process. To conserve space, we focus on the
main insights and omit details. We find that considering lower persistence
yields less strong effects of enforcement constraints. The lower the persis-
tence of the shock process the less binding is the enforcement constraint since
a future bad shock is likely to decrease the value of autarky. Consider the
scenario in which the repudiating country is punished by a stay in full au-
tarky. If one assumes η = 5, K = 4, α̂ = α and φ11 = φ22 = 0.95, the
model collapses to the complete markets scenario. On the other hand, if
countries experience highly persistent shocks, φ11 = φ22 = 0.99, the incen-
tives to default increase. The consumption sharing decreases to about 0.62.
If spill-over effects of the endowment shocks are taken into account, the effect
of enforcement constraints is lower. Assume φ12 = φ21 = 0.025 and consider
η = 5, K = 4, α̂i = α̂j and financial autarky as the punishment threat.
Cross-country consumption correlations decrease to 0.22 compared to 0.05
with no spill-over effects.
As an additional experiment perfect substitutes are considered in com-
bination with an infinite exclusion from future trade. This corresponds to
the enforcement constraints studied by Kehoe and Perri (2002) with the dif-
ference that we assume a pure endowment economy. Note that in the case
of perfect substitutes financial autarky, i.e. the exclusion from international
borrowing and lending, is equivalent to full autarky. The results show that
consumption correlations are strongly reduced though default is punished by
a stay in autarky forever. While Kehoe and Perri (2002) get consumption
correlations equal to 0.28 in a fully-fledged business cycle model, our simple
endowment economy results in consumption correlations around 0.08.
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5.5 Welfare Analysis
In this section we analyze the impact of limited enforceable international
loans on the welfare of the economy. As a welfare measure we consider the
expected lifetime utility of the representative household at the beginning of
period t = s before the realization of the endowment shock is observed. In
order to interpret the results we follow Lucas (1987) and use compensat-
ing variations to formulate differences in expected lifetime utility. In the
following we express the welfare loss in terms of percentage deviation in
certainty-equivalence consumption relative to the steady state.
Tables 7 and 8 consider full autarky and financial autarky as the pun-
ishment scenarios and varies the elasticity of substitution η and the length
of time in autarky K. The results show that the welfare loss generated by
enforcement constraints is very sensitive to the value of default. As an ex-
ample consider full autarky as the punishment scenario, η = 7 and different
exclusion periods K. For K = 4 the welfare loss is about 0.0134 percent
of steady state consumption while for K = 16 it reduces to 0.0037. Given
α̂i = α̂j, the shorter the exclusion period K the more consumption has to
increase relative to the steady state in order to compensate for the welfare
loss generated by enforcement constraints. The huge welfare losses that oc-
cur in a world economy where both countries are in full autarky emphasize
the severeness of full autarky as the punishment threat.
A comparison with financial autarky as the punishment scenario reveals
that the welfare loss is much higher since the incentives to repudiate are
high. Considering e.g. η = 5 the welfare loss is 0.0677 percent of steady state
consumption. As already noted before, increasing the number of exclusion
periods does not have dramatic effects. Note that the welfare losses are of
similar magnitude in a world economy without any access to international
borrowing and lending. This highlights once again that a stay in financial
autarky is not a serious punishment threat.
It is evident that the welfare loss of enforcement constraints is increasing
in the elasticity of substitution η. This corresponds to the result that the
incentives to repudiate are higher the more substitutable the traded goods
are. If we consider perfect substitutes, i.e. η →∞ and ω1 = ω2, and infinite
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exclusion from future trade, the welfare loss is about 0.08 percent of steady
state consumption. This corresponds approximately to the welfare loss of
autarky and is in line with the results in Kim et al. (2003). In a two-country
one-good endowment economy they also have shown that the welfare loss of
autarky is increasing in the persistence of the endowment shocks. Analyz-
ing the sensitivity of the welfare loss of enforcement constraints to different
specifications of the shock process results in similar conclusions.
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied the importance of limited enforceability of interna-
tional loans for international risk sharing, trade fluctuations and welfare in
a two-country two-good endowment economy. We have focused on the spec-
ification of punishment threats and made two substantive changes compared
to previous studies: first, the exclusion from future trade has been allowed to
last only finitely many periods and, second, we have distinguished between
the exclusion from international borrowing and lending and the exclusion
from all intertemporal and interstate trade.
Quantitative results have shown that the impact of limited enforceable
international loans on international risk sharing and trade fluctuations is
substantial. The severeness of the punishment threat has turned out to
be critical for the dynamics of net exports and the size of cross-country
consumption correlations. This is also highlighted by the associated welfare
loss. However, it remains challenging to explain the high volatility of the
terms of trade observed in the data.
This research can be extended in different directions. It seems to be
particularly promising to analyze a fully-fledged international business cycle
model since Backus et al. (1994) point out that the trade balance is crucially
determined by international capital flows. They show that investment dy-
namics generate counter-cyclical net exports as they are observed empirically.
In future research we analyze the impact of limited enforceable international
loans on international capital flows and the implications for the terms of
trade and the trade balance. Moreover, since this paper has shown that the
specification of the punishment threat is crucial, it seems to be interesting
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to endogenize the characteristics of the new contract that is restarted after
the exclusion period. Furthermore, considering a multi-country setup could
give new insights.
23
References
[1] Aiyagari, R., A. Marcet, T. J. Sargent and J. Seppa¨la¨ (2002), “Optimal
Taxation Without State-Contingent Debt”, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 110(6), 1220-1254.
[2] Alvarez, F. and U. J. Jermann (1999), “Quantitative Asset Pricing Im-
plications of Endogenous Solvency Constraints”, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper 6953.
[3] Alvarez, F. and U. J. Jermann (2000), “Efficiency, Equilibria, and Asset
Pricing with Risk of Default”, Econometrica 68(4), 775-798.
[4] Armington, P. S. (1969), “A Theory of Demand for Products Distin-
guished by Place and Production”, International Monetary Fund Staff
Papers 16(1), 159-178.
[5] Backus, D. K. and M. J. Crucini (2000), “Oil Prices and the Terms of
Trade”, Journal of International Economics 50(1), 185-213.
[6] Backus, D. K., P. J. Kehoe and F. E. Kydland (1992), “International
Real Business Cycles”, Journal of Political Economy 100(4), 745-775.
[7] Backus, D. K., P. J. Kehoe and F. E. Kydland (1994), “Dynamics of the
Trade Balance and the Terms of Trade: The J-Curve?”, The American
Economic Review 84(1), 84-103.
[8] Backus, D. K., P. J. Kehoe and F. E. Kydland (1995), “International
Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence”, in Thomas F. Cooley, ed.,
“Frontiers of Business Cycles Research”, Princeton University Press.
[9] Baxter, M. and M. J. Crucini (1995), “Business Cycles and the Asset
Structure of Foreign Trade”, International Economic Review 36(4), 821-
854.
[10] Betts, C. and T. J. Kehoe (2001), “Tradability of Goods and Real Ex-
change Rate Fluctuations”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staff
Report.
[11] Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff (1989), “A Constant Recontracting Model of
Sovereign Debt”, Journal of Political Economy 97, 155-178.
[12] Burstein, A., J. Neves and S. Rebelo (2003), “Distribution Costs
and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics During Exchange-Rate-Based-
Stabilizations”, Journal of Monetary Economics 50(6), 1189-1214.
24
[13] Cole, H. L. and M. Obstfeld (1991), “Commodity Trade and Interna-
tional Risk Sharing: How Much Do Financial Markets Matter?”, Journal
of Monetary Economics 28(1), 3-24.
[14] Cooley, T., R. Marimon and V. Quadrini (2003), “Aggregate Conse-
quences of Limited Contract Enforceability”, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Working Paper 10132.
[15] Cuna˜t, A. and M. Maffezzoli (2004), “Heckscher-Ohlin Business Cycles”,
Review of Economic Dynamics 7(3), 555-585.
[16] Eaton, J. and R. Fernandez (1995), “Sovereign Debt”, in G.M. Gross-
mann and K. Rogoff (eds.), Handbook of International Economics Vol. 3
(Amsterdam, North-Holland), 2031-2077.
[17] Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1981), “Debt with Potential Repudiation:
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis”, Review of Economic Studies 48,
289-309.
[18] Harrigan, J. (1993), “OECD Imports and Trade Barriers in 1983”, Jour-
nal of International Economics 35(1-2), 91-111.
[19] Heathcote, J. and F. Perri (2002), “Financial Autarky and International
Business Cycles”, Journal of Monetary Economics 49(3) 601-627.
[20] Hummels, D. (1999a), “Towards a Geography of Trade costs”, mimeo,
University of Chicago.
[21] Hummels, D. (1999b), “Have International Transportation Costs De-
clined?”, mimeo, University of Chicago.
[22] Jeske, K. (2001), “Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation”,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2001-16.
[23] Kehoe, P. J. and F. Perri (2002), “International Business Cycles with
Endogenous Incomplete Markets”, Econometrica 70(3), 907-928.
[24] Kehoe, P. J. and F. Perri (2004), “Competitive Equilibria with Limited
Enforcement”, Journal of Economic Theory 119(1), 184-206.
[25] Kehoe, T. J. and D. K. Levine (1993), “Debt-Constrained Asset Mar-
kets”, Review of Economic Studies 60, 865-888.
[26] Kehoe, T. J. and D. K. Levine (2001), “Liquidity Constrained Markets
versus Debt Constrained Markets”, Econometrica 69(3), 575-598.
25
[27] Kim, J., S. H. Kim and A. Levin (2003), “Patience, Persistence, and
Welfare Costs of Incomplete Markets in Open Economies”, Journal of
International Economics 61(2), 385-396.
[28] Kocherlakota, N. R. (1996), “Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing
Without Commitment”, Review of Economic Studies 63, 595-609.
[29] Kollmann, R. (1996), “Incomplete Asset Markets and the Cross-Country
Consumption Correlation Puzzle”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 20, 945-961.
[30] Kru¨ger, D. and F. Perri (2005), “Does Income Inequality Lead to Con-
sumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory”, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, forthcoming.
[31] Kru¨ger, D. and H. Uhlig (2005), “Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts
with One-Sided Commitment”, Journal of Monetary Economics, forth-
coming.
[32] Lucas, R. E. (1987), “Models of Business Cycles”, Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell.
[33] Marcet, A. and R. Marimon (1992), “Communication, Commitment,
and Growth”, Journal of Economic Theory 58(1), 219-249.
[34] Marcet, A. and R. Marimon (1998), “Recursive Contracts”, Working
Paper Ref. 337, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[35] Mazzenga, E. and M. O. Ravn (1998), “Relative Price Riddles in Interna-
tional Business Cylce Theory: Are Transport Costs the Explanation?”,
Discussion Paper 312, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[36] Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2000), “The Six Major Puzzles in Interna-
tional Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?”, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Working Paper 7777.
[37] Shiells, C. and K. Reinhart (1993), “Armington Models and Terms of
Trade Effects: Some Econometric Evidence for North America”, Cana-
dian Journal of Economics 80, 169-174.
[38] Stockman, A. C. and L. Tesar (1995), “Tastes and Technology in a
Two-Country Model of the Business Cycle: Explaining International
Comovements”, The American Economic Review 85(1), 168-184.
26
[39] Tauchen, G. (1986), “Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to
Univariate and Vector Autoregressions”, Economics Letters 20, 177-181.
[40] Trefler, D. and H. Lai (1999), “The Gains from Trade: Standard Errors
with the CES Monopolistic Competition Model”, mimeo, University of
Toronto.
[41] Whalley, J. (1985), “Trade Liberization among Major Trading Areas”,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[42] Zimmermann, C. (1997), “International Trade over the Business Cycle:
Stylized Facts and Remaining Puzzles”, Center for Research on Eco-
nomic Fluctuations and Employment, Universite´ du Que´bec a Montre´al,
Working Paper No. 37R.
27
Tables and Figures
Table 1: International Co-movements
AUS CAN FRA GER IT JPN NOR UK US
Correlations of Output Across Countries corr(yi, yj)
AUS 1.0 .62 -.01 -.20 .20 .12 .10 .18 .16
CAN 1.0 .18 -.28 .39 .12 .09 .42 .38
FRA 1.0 .32 .49 .54 .01 .49 .58
GER 1.0 .36 .37 .22 .05 .15
IT 1.0 .40 .22 .19 .18
JPN 1.0 .25 .51 .46
NOR 1.0 .21 .07
UK 1.0 .55
US 1.0
Correlations of Consumption Across Countries corr(ci, cj)
AUS 1.0 .20 .02 -.23 .06 -.24 -.16 -.10 -.20
CAN 1.0 -.02 -.27 .45 -.02 .11 .33 .41
FRA 1.0 -.04 .06 .18 .09 .19 .05
GER 1.0 .21 .09 .11 -.11 .02
IT 1.0 .07 .12 .27 .03
JPN 1.0 .04 .54 .56
NOR 1.0 .02 .12
UK 1.0 .44
US 1.0
Notes: The natural logarithm has been taken before data series are Hodrick-
Prescott filtered (smoothing parameter = 1600). Variables are real gross do-
mestic product y and real consumption expenditures c. Data are quarterly
from the International Monetary Fund IMF, Financial Statistics. The sample
period is 1970:1 to 1998:4.
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Table 2: Properties of Terms of Trade and Net Exports
AUS CAN FRA GER IT JPN NOR UK US
Properties of Terms of Trade
corr(y,p) -.35 -.50 -.43 -.16 .17 -.25 -.34 -.22 -.46
% std (p) 6.59 3.07 3.08 3.49 4.03 7.67 6.29 3.17 3.08
Properties of Net Exports
corr(nx,y) -.36 -.27 -.35 -.53 -.29 -.46 .11 -.34 -.25
% std (nx) .47 .35 .93 .92 .75 .11 1.62 .94 .15
Notes: Except for net exports nx the natural logarithm has been taken before
data series are Hodrick-Prescott filtered (smoothing parameter = 1600). Vari-
ables are real gross domestic product y, real consumption expenditures c and
the terms of trade p defined as the relative prices of imports to exports. nx is
the ratio of net exports to output. Data are quarterly from the International
Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics. The sample period is 1970:1 to 1998:4.
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Figure 1: Full Autarky: The Importance of K and α̂
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Notes: This figure shows the value of the normalized multiplier of the domestic
enforcement constraint d1(qt−1) if asymmetric shocks occur that increase domestic
endowment. The new weight α̂ is given by α̂ = 0.5 + ζ. It is assumed that the
defaulting country is punished by a K-period exclusion from intertemporal and
interstate trade. The figure refers to qt−1 = 1, η = 5 and b1/y1 = 0.15.
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Figure 2: Full Autarky Versus Financial Autarky: The Importance of η
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Notes: This figure shows the value of the normalized multiplier of the domestic
enforcement constraint d1(qt−1) if asymmetric shocks occur that increase domestic
endowment. Full autarky refers to the scenario where the defaulting country is
punished by exclusion from full trade. Financial autarky refers to the scenario
where the defaulting country is punished by exclusion from international borrowing
and lending. The figure refers to qt−1 = 1, K = 4, ζ = 0, i.e. α̂i = α̂j , and
b1/y1 = 0.15.
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Table 3: Limited Enforceability and International Risk Sharing: Full Autarky
and the Importance of K and α̂
Relative Percentage Change in corr(c1, c2)
η = 5 η = 6 η = 7
K/ζ -.01 0 .01 -.01 0 .01 -.01 0 .01
4 0 -8.3 -17.4 -4.8 -21.5 -26.9 -18.7 -32.9 -38.6
8 0 -6.2 -23.1 0 -19.4 -29.5 -12.2 -30.0 -38.7
16 0 0 -29.1 0 -12.4 -30.0 0 -27.7 -31.7
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -35.2
Notes: Relative change in correlations generated by imperfectly enforceable in-
ternational loans is measured in percent of complete markets correlations. The
new weight α̂ is given by α̂ = 0.5 + ζ. It is assumed that default is punished
by a K-period stay in full autarky. The natural logarithm has been taken be-
fore simulated time series are Hodrick-Prescott filtered (smoothing parameter =
1600). Entries are averages of the correlations of 250 simulations of 500 quarters
each where the first 50 observations are discarded. c1 and c2 denote domestic
and foreign consumption, respectively. The results refer to b1/y1 = 0.15.
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Table 4: Limited Enforceability and International Risk Sharing: Financial
Autarky and the Importance of η
Relative Percentage Change in corr(c1, c2)
K/η 1.5 2 3 4 5
4 -76.8 -86.7 -92.8 -94.9 -95.6
8 -76.8 -86.7 -92.8 -94.9 -95.6
16 -76.8 -86.7 -92.8 -94.8 -95.6
32 -76.5 -85.8 -91.4 -94.2 -95.4
Notes: Relative change in correlations generated by imperfectly enforceable in-
ternational loans is measured in percent of complete markets correlations. It is
assumed that default is punished by a K-period exclusion from international bor-
rowing and lending. The natural logarithm has been taken before simulated time
series are Hodrick-Prescott filtered (smoothing parameter = 1600). Entries are
averages of the correlations over 250 simulations of 500 quarters each where the
first 50 observations are discarded. The results refer to b1/y1 = 0.15 and ζ = 0,
i.e. α̂i = α̂j .
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Table 5: Limited Enforceability and the Quantity and Price Anomaly
corr(c1, c2) corr(p, y1) % std(p)
η 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7
Import Share b1/y1 = 0.09
Full Autarky 0.56 0.45 0.38 0.70 0.69 0.69 1.20 0.86 0.67
Financial Autarky 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.41 0.33 0.24
Complete Markets 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.71 0.71 0.70 1.71 1.46 1.28
Import Share b1/y1 = 0.12
Full Autarky 0.75 0.62 0.52 0.68 0.69 0.70 1.17 0.86 0.66
Financial Autarky 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.42 0.35 0.29
Complete Markets 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.70 0.70 0.71 1.39 1.19 1.03
Import Share b1/y1 = 0.15
Full Autarky 0.89 0.77 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.69 1.11 0.85 0.66
Financial Autarky 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.43 0.36 0.30
Complete Markets 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.70 0.70 0.70 1.19 1.01 0.88
Notes: Full autarky refers to the scenario where the defaulting country is punished
by an exclusion from intertemporal and interstate trade. Financial autarky refers
to the scenario where the defaulting country is punished by an exclusion from
international borrowing and lending. The natural logarithm has been taken before
simulated time series are Hodrick-Prescott filtered (smoothing parameter = 1600).
Statistics refer to averages over 250 simulations of 500 quarters each where the first
50 observations are discarded. c1 and c2 denote domestic and foreign consumption,
respectively, p are the terms of trade and y1 is domestic output. Results refer to
ζ = 0, i.e. α̂i = α̂j , and K = 4.
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Table 6: Limited Enforceability and Trade Fluctuations
Complete Limited Enforceable Loans:
Markets Full Autarky Financial Autarky
corr(c, y) 0.79 0.83 0.99
corr(im, y) -0.43 -0.39 0.62
corr(ex, y) 0.89 0.90 0.79
corr(nx, y) 0.71 0.69 -0.32
%
std(c1)
std(y1)
0.71 0.74 0.98
% std(nx) 1.30 1.15 0.002
Notes: Full autarky refers to the scenario where the defaulting coun-
try is punished by an exclusion from intertemporal and interstate
trade. Financial autarky refers to the scenario where the default-
ing country is punished by an exclusion from international borrow-
ing and lending. Except for net exports the natural logarithm has
been taken before simulated time series are Hodrick-Prescott filtered
(smoothing parameter = 1600). Statistics refer to averages over 250
simulations of 500 quarters each where the first 50 observations are
discarded. c1 and y1 denote domestic consumption and output. im
and ex are the imports b1 and exports a2. nx = (a2−pb1)/y1 denote
net exports. Results refer to ζ = 0, i.e. α̂i = α̂j , K = 4, η = 5 and
b1/y1 = 0.15.
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Table 7: Welfare Loss: Full Autarky
Limited Enforceable Loans
Punishment: Full Autarky
K/η 5 6 7
4 0.0008 0.0065 0.0134
8 0 0.0036 0.0097
16 0 0.0002 0.0037
32 0 0
∞ 0 0 0
Full Autarky
η 5 6 7
- 2.2939 1.8254 1.5198
Notes: Welfare loss is measured rela-
tive to complete markets as percentage
deviation in certainty-equivalence con-
sumption relative to the steady state.
Results associated with limited en-
forceability refer to ζ = 0, i.e. α̂i = α̂j ,
and b1/y1 = 0.15.
Table 8: Welfare Loss: Financial Autarky
Limited Enforceable Loans
Punishment: Financial Autarky
K/η 1.5 2 3 4 5
4 0.0322 0.0449 0.0576 0.0639 0.0677
8 0.0322 0.0449 0.0576 0.0639 0.0677
16 0.0322 0.0449 0.0576 0.0639 0.0677
32 0.0321 0.0448 0.0575 0.0638 0.0676
∞ 0.0319 0.0444 0.0568 0.0630 0.0666
Financial Autarky
η 1.5 2 3 4 5
- 0.0323 0.0451 0.0580 0.0643 0.0681
Notes: Welfare loss is measured relative to complete mar-
kets as percentage deviation in certainty-equivalence con-
sumption relative to the steady state. Results associated
with limited enforceability refer to ζ = 0, i.e. α̂i = α̂j ,
and b1/y1 = 0.15.
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